State of Utah v. Gerald Glen Bell : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1987
State of Utah v. Gerald Glen Bell : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Sandra L. Sjogren; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Plaintiff.
M. Cort Griffin; Harding & Associates; Attorneys for Defendant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State of Utah v. Gerald Glen Bell, No. 870150.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1643
BRIEF 
??oiSb 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
GERALD GLEN BELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Priority 2 
Case No. 870150 
MIEF_QF_RES_POJDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED SECOND 
DEGREE MURDER, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, AND 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN 
THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, THE HONORABLE 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, PRESIDING. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
M. CORT GRIFFIN 
Harding and Associates, P.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Attorney for Appellant 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
GERALD GLEN BELL, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
Priority 2 
Case No. 870150 
BRIEE_QE_BESPQSPENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED SECOND 
DEGREE MURDER, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, AND 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN 
THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, THE HONORABLE 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, PRESIDING. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
M.-CORT GRIFFIN 
Harding and Associates, P.C. 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Attorney for Appellant 
?ABL£-0ILC.£HXE31£ 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE , 
TATEMENT OF ISSUES , 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE , 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS , 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS , 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
POINT II 
POINT III 
POINT IV 
THE PROSECUTOR'S DISCRETION TO 
DIRECT FILE IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
AND BYPASS JUVENILE COURT 
CERTIFICATION IS CONSTITUTIONAL... 
DEFENDANT WAIVED THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER THE JUVENILE COURT RECALL 
HEARING PROVISIONS VIOLATE DUE 
PROCESS BY FAILING TO APPEAL FROM 
THE JUVENILE COURT'S FINAL ORDER 
REFUSING TO RECALL THE CASE 
THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF 
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN S 78-3a-
25(8) REQUIRING APPROVAL OF THE 
DIVISION OF YOUTH CORRECTIONS 
BEFORE DEFENDANT COULD BE 
COMMITTED TO THEIR CUSTODY , 
THIS COURT NEED NOT CONSIDER 
WHETHER DEFENDANT COULD BE 
CONVICTED OF BOTH ATTEMPTED FELONY 
MURDER AND AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
SINCE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF 
ATTEPTED INTENTIONAL MURDER, BUT 
EVEN IF DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF 
ATTEMPTED FELONY MURDER, HE COULD 
ALSO BE CONVICTED OF AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY 
POINT V AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION AFTER 
THE COURT ANNOUNCED ITS VERDICT 
WAS NOT A DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
VIOLATION 
CONCLUSION 
APPENDICES 
Page 
ii 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
11 
12 
16 
17 
__£_E_Oi:_Ay__Oj&il_B_ 
_______I__B 
B___£___i__£X____B____, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) 5 
B_I___m__x_B_y__X_i 663 P.2d 65 (Utah 1983) 4 
_l_y._______B___£__> 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531 (1956) 10 
______x___£3pl£, 645 P.2d 262 (1982) 13 
_D_X£___C_£___, 575 P.2d 181 (Utah 1978) 4 , 7 , 8 
j D _ i e _ C l a i i £ l b u £ f c , 700 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1985) 9 
In_X£_B___r 733 P.2d 1199 (Co lo . 1987) 6 
___B_£________£, 692 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1984) 4 , 5 
___£_________£i 654 P.2d 1080 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) 6 
___S_£_£X_____i__£, 656 P.2d 114 (Idaho 1982) 5 
_fl_P_£___________, 644 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1980) 13 
_£_P_£_v__T_£_p£, 641 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1982) 5 
_____________ r 419 U.S. 393 (1975) 5 
____£_£__X__________________iX__f 610 P.2d 256 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1980) 6 
____£_______£____i 700 P.2d 76 (Idaho App. 1985) 6 
____fi____Bi___fi/ 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986) 6 
_________BX__Df 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985) 13 
____£___________r 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977) 10 
______________£, 407 P.2d 627 (Ore. 1965) 9 
SJtA.fcfi_X.i_PfiifiX.SOji, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984) 1 3 , 1 4 
______________» 655 P.2d 690 (Utah 1980) 13 
____£____£_______i 570, 1014 (Ore. Ct. App. 1977) 9 
____£_y_______£Xr 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986) 11 
fi_i_fi______fi_____B____r 472 F.2d 1329 (U.S.App.D.C. 1972)... 5 
Hfillfi_y^_Cl)ildlfiDlS-Aid_Socifitx_i?£_HiaJ}, 6 81 P.2d 199 
(Utah 1984) 5 
WofldwJXd_X.L_iteinHXJistLt, 556 F.2d 781 (5th c i r . 1977) 4 
SIATUT£g_AHD_BULE5 
Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , Ar t . V s e c t i o n 1 9 ,10 
Utah Code Ann. S 7 6 - 4 - 1 0 1 ( 1 ) (1978) 11 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4 (1982) 12,13 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (h) (1987) 1 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-3a-25(6) (1987) 4,7 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-3a-25(8) (1987) 9 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-3a-25(9) (1987) 7,8 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent i 
vs. 
GERALD GLEN BELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Priority 2 
Case No. 870150 
BBIEF_QF_RE£P£NDENT 
!lUBISDICTIQN_AND_NATyBE
-
.QF_CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of attempted second 
degree murder, a second degree felony, and aggravated robbery, a 
first degree felony, in the Fourth District Court. This Court 
has jurisdiction to review this case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (h) (1987). 
STATEM£NT_Q£_I££I2££ 
1. Do the direct filing and recall provisions of the 
juvenile code violate equal protection under either the federal 
or state constitutions by treating similarly situated persons 
differently without a valid State interest? 
2. Did defendant waive the issue of the 
constitutionality of the juvenile court recall provisions under 
the Due Process Clause by failing to directly appeal from the 
final order of the juvenile court refusing to recall the case? 
3. Does the legislature's grant of authority to Youth 
Corrections to review a decision of the trial court to remand a 
juvenile offender convicted as an adult to the jurisdiction of 
Youth Corrections infringe upon judicial power? 
4. Is the crime of aggravated robbery a lesser 
included offense of attempted intentional second degree murder 
thus precluding a conviction for both crimes? 
5. Did the trial court err in granting the State's 
motion to amend the information to conform to the stipulated 
facts and the verdict of the court after the verdict was 
rendered? 
5TMEMENT_PF
-
.TH£_5ASJ5 
The State initially charged defendant, a seventeen year 
oldf in the Fourth District Court with aggravated robbery and two 
counts of attempted first degree murder (R. 5-6). Judge Lewis 
Trevort refused to recall jurisdiction over defendant to the 
juvenile court on October 24, 1986 (R. 79). The information was 
amended three times, eventually charging defendant with attempted 
intentional second degree murder and aggravated robbery (R. 151). 
Defendant waived a jury trial and stipulated to the facts of the 
crimes (R. 98-106). Judge George E. Ballif, found defendant 
guilty of both charges on February 6, 1987 (R. 117). Judge 
Ballif sentenced defendant to a one-to-fifteen-year term in the 
Utah State Prison for attempted second degree murder and to a 
five-to-life term for aggravated robbery (R. 166-67) . 
The State agrees with the statement of facts set forth 
in the appellant's brief except for the last two paragraphs which 
represent argument rather than statements of fact. The facts 
were stipulated to in the trial court (R. 103-06). A copy of the 
trial court's findings of fact (R. 111-17), entitled "Ruling", is 
included in the addendum to appellant's brief. 
I. Review of defendants equal protection claim 
regarding the juvenile direct filing statute does not require 
strict scrutiny but must only meet the rational basis test. 
Under this test, prosecutorial discretion has been upheld in 
other courts and should be similarly upheld here. 
II. Defendant waived his potential due process claims 
regarding the juvenile court refusal to recall jurisdiction of 
his case by failing to directly appeal the juvenile court order 
which was a finalf appealable order. Jurisdiction over such 
appeals lies with the juvenile court, not this Court and 
defendant should not be allowed to circumvent the normal 
appellate process. 
III. The legislature's delegation of authority to the 
Division of Youth Corrections to review placement of juveniles in 
the juvenile system after conviction in the district court as an 
adult does not improperly infringe upon judicial power. Rather 
it is an appropriate delegation of legislative power. 
IV. Defendants claim that he could not be convicted 
of both attempted second degree murder and aggravated robbery is 
moot if this Court upholds the amended information. Even if 
defendant was convicted of attempted felony murder, he could also 
be convicted of a completed aggravated robbery under the facts of 
this case because proof of the attempted murder does not 
necessarily include proof of a completed aggravated robbery. 
V. Defendant's substantial rights were unaffected by 
the amended information and there was no double jeopardy 
violation when the information was amended after verdict. 
ARGUMSUJ 
THE PROSECUTOR'S DISCRETION TO DIRECT FILE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT AND BYPASS JUVENILE 
COURT CERTIFICATION IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Defendant argues that Utah Code Ann. S 78-3a-25(6) 
(1987) violates the equal protection clauses of both the federal 
and state constitutions because it allows prosecutors to treat 
similarly situated persons differently. He further urges this 
Court to apply a strict scrutiny method of review on appeal 
because he concludes that the statute impugns the right to 
personal liberty, which he claims is a fundamental right. Upon 
review, this Court should find that defendant was not denied 
equal protection of the law because of his treatment in the 
direct filing system rather than the juvenile certification 
system. 
First, it is important that "a juvenile offender has no 
right to a certification hearing before being prosecuted as an 
adult." BuiDljjaiD^ Y^ -H^ yjtf^ xiJ, 663 P.2d 65, 67 (Utah 1983), citing 
In-L£-b£Qh&&QIli 575 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1978). Thus, defendant 
cannot claim that he had a right to treatment as a juvenile. 
"Since one does not have an inherent right to be prosecuted as a 
juvenile but that is a privilege granted by the legislature, the 
legislature can restrict or qualify the privilege as it sees fit, 
so long as there is not involved any arbitrary or discriminatory 
classification." aahnk&-XjL-&tet&* 692 P.2d 911, 929 (Wyo. 1984), 
citing »SfidKAEd-XjL_V&iBMXisht# 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th cir. 1977). 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that, in 
general, prosecutorial discretion whether and how to charge 
crimes does not violate equal protection so long as the decision 
is not based upon an unjustifiable standard or an arbitrary 
classification such as race or religion. Bordenkircher v. Hayes. 
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). The Utah Legislature has vested 
discretion in the prosecutor to decide what charges to file and 
in what court to file them in cases such as this one. Although 
judicial review might be justified if the decision of the 
prosecutor were based on suspect factors such as race, religion 
or some other arbitrary classification, there is no equal 
protection violation in the absence of such factors. JahnJsfif 692 
P.2d at 929, fiiiins UDii£3_Si3Jt£S_y*_Bl3Hd, 472 F.2d 1329, 1337 
(U.S.App.D.C. 1972); P£fipl£_yA_Thj?ip£, 641 P.2d 935, 939 (Colo. 
1982) . 
Defendant claims that the state must have a compelling 
interest in treating him differently than juveniles who are 
initially charged in the juvenile system and later certified to 
the district court based upon his erroneous assumption that 
physical liberty is a fundamental right and that any statute that 
may ultimately affect physical liberty must pass strict scrutiny. 
If this were true, every criminal statute would be entitled to 
strict scrutiny whenever it was challenged on equal protection 
grounds. Even a fundamental right is not necessarily subjected 
to strict scrutiny. Ljansaeyfii_ijL_S.tfl.tfi§ 656 P.2d 114, 116 (Idaho 
1982) CJLtlflS jS£SDfl_Y__I_*Mfl# 419 U.S. 393, 406 (1975), c.f., Wfills 
x±-GbiiaL£nLa-bia-&QGi&&-.Qt-Uteh, 681 p.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984) 
(upholding statute affecting fundamental parental rights under 
rational basis review)• Consequently, the state need only have a 
rational basis for treating juveniles over the age of 16, charged 
with attempted second degree murder and other enumerated crimes, 
differently than juveniles charged with other crimes. j§ifii.e_YjL 
BiSbSPr 717 P.2d 261, 266 (Utah 1986). 
Since, the appropriate standard of review in this case 
is not strict scrutiny, requiring a precisely tailored statute 
serving a compelling state interest as defendant claims, but is 
the regular equal protection standard of a rational basis for the 
distinction, the question is whether the legislature has a 
rational basis for treating juveniles within the class 
differently. The basis here is that persons who have committed 
the serious crimes enumerated will likely require lengthy 
supervision and are clearly a threat to public safety. Since the 
juvenile system loses jurisdiction over an offender at age 21, 
persons 16 or older may be more appropriately dealt with in the 
adult system that contemplates lengthier supervision. Defendant 
concedes that the state has a compelling interest of protection 
of the public in treating certain juvenile offenders, such as 
defendant, differently. Brief of App. at 17. He merely claims 
that it is the prosecutorial discretion that is objectionable 
because it is too broad. As can be seen from the argument above, 
such discretion does not violate equal protection. SS£ 3lSQ In 
Xfi-BjLfi*, 733 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Colo. 1987); StaXs^^hn^SLSQL, 700 
P.2d 76, 80 (Idaho App. 1985); S£ate-&X-L£ljL-GQa£S-XjL-Bak&B£ia*li 
610 P.2d 256, 259 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); 2sme£-X±-S£a££e 654 
P.2d 1080, 1083 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). 
Defendant contends that juveniles over 16 may be 
treated in radically different manners under § 78-3a-25(6). This 
claim is not founded in a reasonable interpretation of the 
statute. A person who is directly filed against in the district 
court still has the opportunity to be treated in the juvenile 
system under the recall statute. The juvenile court is notified 
of the direct filing and may recall jurisdiction in appropriate 
cases. There is little risk that a prosecutor would improperly 
prosecute a juvenile who could be more appropriately dealt with 
in the juvenile system. In factr should the juvenile be 
recalled, he may still be certified to the district court under 
§ 78-3a-25(9). The recall provision actually functions as a 
safety valve in a system where the legislature could as easily 
have mandated treatment as an adult for juveniles fitting the 
criteria for direct filing since they have no right to treatment 
as a juvenile. Ifl_l£_&.fc£l)£S3Il# 575 P.2d at 184. 
Because S 78-3a-25 does not create an arbitrary 
classification and is based upon a reasonable state interest, it 
is constitutional and defendant was not denied equal protection 
by the direct filing procedure. 
DEFENDANT WAIVED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE 
JUVENILE COURT RECALL HEARING PROVISIONS 
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS BY FAILING TO APPEAL 
FROM THE JUVENILE COURT'S FINAL ORDER 
REFUSING TO RECALL THE CASE. 
Defendant was 17 years old at the time of the crimes. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25(6) (1987) allows the prosecutor to 
directly file criminal charges in the district court against a 
juvenile who is 16 years old at the time he commits certain 
enumerated crimes subject to recall of jurisdiction by the 
juvenile court. Defendant claims that he was denied due process 
by the recall hearing process because the statute does not 
provide for adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard. 
Defendant waived this claim by failing to appeal from the 
juvenile court order denying recall. 
This Court has previously held that a juvenile court 
order certifying a juvenile to the district court for trial as an 
adult is a final appealable order. In Re Atchq^QQ, 57 5 P.2d 181 
(Utah 1978). Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals held that a 
decision of the juvenile court not to recall jurisdiction under 
§ 78-3a-25(9) is a final appealable order under the same 
reasoning. See Order on Petition for Permission to Appeal, ID_RS 
£y£dr case no. 880108-CA, attached as Appendix A. Because the 
order denying recall in this case was a final appealable order, 
defendant should have taken a direct appeal from the juvenile 
court order and may not now circumvent the regular appellate 
process by using his motion to dismiss in the trial court as a 
basis for this Court's review of these issues. 
This reasoning is sound because the juvenile court 
record is not a part of the record before this Court. Review of 
this record would be critical in any attempt by this Court to 
examine the constitutionality of the process defendant received. 
To show that he was denied due process, defendant is required to 
establish that the process he actually received was inadequate, 
not simply that, under some interpretation of the statute, a 
person could hypothetically be denied due process. In re 
ClalifilbUClS # 700 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1 9 8 5 ) ; S iat f i -^-BichlDf ind, 570 , 
1014 (Ore. Ct . App. 1 9 7 7 ) ; SJt3Jtje_2jL_LiJtil£, 407 P.2d 627 , 631 
(Ore. 1965). 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
IN S 7 8-3a-25(8) REQUIRING APPROVAL OF THE 
DIVISION OF YOUTH CORRECTIONS BEFORE DEFENDANT 
COULD BE COMMITTED TO THEIR CUSTODY. 
Defendant claims that conditioning any remand at 
sentencing to the custody of Youth Corrections by the district 
court on approval of the Division of Youth Corrections violates 
Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. He argues that 
the ability of Youth Corrections to reject a remand to their 
jurisdiction infringes upon the power of the judiciary to impose 
sentences. However, defendant fails to recognize that it is 
within the power of the legislature to determine the appropriate 
sentencing alternatives that will be available to judges. Thus, 
it is not the power of the judiciary that is infringed in this 
instance, rather it is that the legislature has delegated to the 
Division of Youth Corrections the power to determine the 
appropriate placement of juveniles in the interest of the 
juvenile and the public. The issue then, is whether the 
legislature could properly delegate to the executive branch the 
discretion to choose the appropriate placement of juveniles on an 
individual basis rather than mandating itself that all juveniles 
tried as adults be treated in any particular manner. 
Here, the legislature could properly delegate the power 
to Youth Corrections to evaluate, using their expertise in the 
field and based upon individual cases, whether a particular 
juvenile convicted in the adult court should nevertheless be 
placed in juvenile programs at sentencing. Article Vf section 1 
of the Utah Constitution does not forbid all delegations of power 
by the legislature to an executive branch. State v. Gallion, 572 
P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977). The legislature may lawfully empower 
state agencies to administer their policies "and may confer upon 
[them] certain powers and the duty of determining the question of 
the existence of certain facts upon which the effect or execution 
of its legislative policy may be dependent." !£• at 687, aufliina 
ClaX&Qn-XjL-BsnafiJLt, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531, 535 (1956) 
(other citation omitted). 
All that the legislature has done in this instance is 
to give to Youth Corrections the power to implement its policy of 
treating appropriate juvenile candidates in the juvenile system 
even after conviction in the adult criminal system. For this 
reason, the delegation of authority is appropriate and 
constitutional. 
In any event, defendant lacks standing to challenge 
this portion of the statute because he was not referred to Youth 
Corrections after sentencing. In this case the district court 
judge did not feel it was appropriate to refer defendant to Youth 
Corrections and chose to sentence him as an adult. Defendant's 
sentence and subsequent placement did not, therefore, hinge upon 
approval by the Division of Youth Corrections. He should not be 
heard to complain that someone might be prejudiced by the 
Division'8 hypothetical actions where he was not prejudiced by 
any such actions* 
£QItf£_I¥ 
THIS COURT NEED NOT CONSIDER WHETHER DEFENDANT 
COULD BE CONVICTED OF BOTH ATTEMPTED FELONY 
MURDER AND AGGRAVATED ROBBERY SINCE DEFENDANT 
WAS CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED INTENTIONAL MURDER, 
BUT EVEN IF DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED 
FELONY MURDER HE COULD ALSO BE CONVICTED OF 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court should have 
granted his motion to correct his sentence to void his separate 
sentences for attempted second degree murder and aggravated 
robbery. He explains that aggravated robbery is an included 
offense of felony murder and that he could not be convicted for 
both crimes under $£ai,£_Xj>.„£hattSLr 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant fails to recognize, however, that since he was 
convicted of attempted intentional murder not felony murder, his 
argument is moot. 
Even if this Court were to find that defendant should 
have been convicted of attempted felony murder instead of 
attempted intentional murder because the information was 
improperly amended (see Point V below), a completed aggravated 
burglary is not an included offense of attempted felony murder. 
The elements of attempted felony murder require that a person, 
having the mental state necessary to commit the crime, take a 
substantial step towards commission of the crime. Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-4-101(1) (1978). A substantial step toward commission of 
felony murder does not require a completed aggravated robbery. 
An attempted robbery, while armed, would be sufficient to satisfy 
the substantial step required here. 
Where, as in this case, a defendant is charged with a 
completed aggravated robbery (see Third Amended Information, 
Appendix B), and attempted felony murder, both convictions may 
stand because proof of the completed aggravated robbery would not 
necessarily be required to prove attempted felony murder. For 
this reason, aggravated robbery is not, under the facts of this 
case, an included offense of attempted second degree murder. 
Finally, even if the two crimes did merge as defendant 
asserts, it would be inappropriate to reward defendant with a 
sentence on the third degree felony attempted second degree 
murder only and strike the greater sentence for the first degree 
felony aggravated robbery. At the least, defendant should be 
required to serve the sentence that is legislatively imposed for 
the greater degree of crime rather than for the lesser. 
AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION AFTER THE COURT 
ANNOUNCED ITS VERDICT WAS NOT A DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
VIOLATION. 
Defendant claims that the State's amendment of the 
information after the verdict violated the federal and state 
double jeopardy and due process clauses and Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-35-4 (1982). The amendment was, however, proper and 
violated none of the defendant's rights* 
Defendant was initially charged with attempted first 
degree murder, intentional offense, and went through preliminary 
bearing on that charge. Later, the State amended the charge to 
attempted second degree felony murder, the defendant pled not 
guilty and both parties stipulated to the facts of the crime. 
The stipulation includes facts upon which the judge, as trier of 
fact, could have found that defendant intentionally shot Ms. 
Penney (see Stipulation at R. 104-105). Defendant stipulated 
that it required some conscious act of pointing the gun and 
pulling back on both the hammer and the trigger to shoot Ms. 
Penney and the trial court found, based upon these facts that 
defendant intended to shoot Ms. Penney (see Ruling at R. 115) . 
Based upon the court's finding an intentional act, the State 
moved to amend the information and the court granted the motion. 
While S 77-35-4 discusses amendments prior to verdict 
and allows for certain amendments after verdict, it does not 
specifically preclude other types of amendments. The State's use 
of subsection (d) to justify its motion does not require that 
this court reverse the trial court if there were other proper 
grounds for the amendment. 5ia.tfi_AU_Bxy.ailr 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 
1985) . 
This Court has not previously addressed the issue of 
amendments to informations after verdict. Nevertheless, the 
cases cited by defendant as being inapposite because they address 
pre-verdict amendments are instructive on the appropriate 
standard of review even for post-verdict amendments. £Jtai___* 
ElQQli 655 P.2d 690 (Utah 1980) and £_a____--£_-£-S_*n r 681 P.2d 
1210 (Utah 1984), allow pre-verdict amendments where a 
defendant's substantial rights are not prejudiced and no new 
offense is charged. This standard is similar to one employed by 
Colorado in Pfiflplfi____iSthn&QU* 644 P.2d 34, 37 (Colo* App. 1980) 
a_Ild 3Uh Afi_u GimW-XjL-.2&Q2l&* 645 P.2d 262 (1982) (affirmed on 
other grounds) which disallowed a post-verdict amendment of an 
information that prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights. 
The issue here, then, is whether defendant's 
substantial rights were affected by the amendment. Because 
defendant stipulated to the facts supporting the judge's 
findings, noted that the issue at trial would have been whether 
he possessed intent to shoot Ms* Penney (T. dtd. 2-4-87 at 12, 
18-24), and was not convicted of any different offense than the 
one charged, his rights were not prejudiced. 
Defendant claims that his rights were prejudiced 
because he was not given adequate notice of the charge and 
because his conviction violated double jeopardy. However, 
defendant was prepared for and made an argument attempting to 
negate intent. He claimed that the gun could be fired 
accidentally and that it was fired accidentally (T. dtd. 2-4-87 
at 33) . 
Nor was defendant subjected to double jeopardy for he 
was convicted of attempted second degree murder only once. The 
amendment did not result in two convictions for the same offense 
nor did he receive multiple punishments for attempted second 
degree murder. Here, as in Peterson* defendant was not 
prejudiced by the shift from one subsection of the second degree 
murder statute to another subsection and the amendment should 
stand. 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the decision of the district court. 
DATED this day of 
^ -
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
'4&£gzaomaL 
NDRA L . 
s i s t a n t A-lftorYiey'General 
MAILING_CER2IEICA1E 
I hereby c e r t i f y that on the 
A. 
day of May, 1988, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and exact 
copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent to M. Cort 
Griffin, 110 South Main Street, Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062. 
APPENDIX A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
State of Utah, 
in the interest of 
Nicholas Hans Byrd 
ORDER ON PETITION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
Case No. 880108-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Davidson and Greenwood (On Law and Motion). 
This matter is before the Court on the Petition for 
Permission to Appeal filed by defendant Nicholas Hans Byrd 
pursuant to Rule 5, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. This 
Court has reviewed the submissions of the parties, and concludes 
that the Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Recall 
Jurisdiction and the Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to 
Declare Section 78-3a-25(6) and (9) Unconstitutional constitute 
the final orders of the Second District Juvenile Court 
terminating the jurisdiction of that Court. The orders are not 
interlocutory and constitute final, appealable orders under the 
reasoning set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in State In Re 
AtCheSOn, 575 P.2d 181 (Utah 1978). 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Permission to 
Appeal is denied because the orders being appealed from are not 
interlocutory.1 
DATED this J*3 day of March, 1988. 
FOR THE COURT: 
rxman H. Jack 
1. In a letter dated March 16, 1988, appellant's counsel advised 
this Court that he also filed a direct appeal from the orders of 
the Second District Juvenile Court "to protect Mr. Byrd9s rights 
in the event that this Court determined that [the Juvenile 
Court's] decision was indeed the final order in this case forever 
divesting the juvenile court of jurisdiction.* Counsel concedes 
that in such event, an interlocutory appeal would be 
unnecessary. With the denial of the present petition for 
interlocutory appeal, all further proceedings will be in the 
direct appeal docketed as Case No. 88-0160-CA. 
APPENDIX B 
i>e \ 
DEXTER L. ANDERSON 
4 DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY \t-l 
MILLARD COUNTY 
750 South Highway 99 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
(801) 743-6522 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
GERALD GLEN BELL, 
Defendant. 
DOB - 10/03/69 
THIRD AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
#1005 
The undersigned, under oath, states on information and 
belief that the Defendant on or about the 13th of October, 
1986 in Millard County, State of Utah committed the crimes 
of ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE HOMOCIDE, a Second Degree Felony 
and AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony as follows: 
COUNT #1 - ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE HOMOCIDE 
In that the Defendant, acting with the intent to cause the 
death of another, to wit; Carley Johnson Penney, did engage 
in conduct constituting a substantial step towards causing 
the death of the said Carley Johnson Penney in violation of 
U.C.A.76-5-203(1)(a) and 76-4-101(1), a Second Degree Felony 
pursuant to U.C.A.76-5-203(2) AND 76-4-102(2). 
COUNT «2 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
In that the Defendant did unlawfully and intentionally take 
property, to wit; 2 packs of cigarettes, 6 cans Mountain Dew 
soda pop and 13 gallons of gasoline from the person in 
possession of said property by means of force and during 
said robbery, the Defendant did use a firearm, to wit; a .22 
caliber revolver, a First Degree Felony in violation of 
U.C.A.76-6-302. 
This Information is 
following witnesses: 
based on evidence obtained from the 
Carley Johnson Penney 
Det. Robert Dekker 
Sheriff Ed Phillips 
Deputy Dan Rowley 
rpt*ty James W. Masner 
Authorized for present-
and filing: 
Subscribed and sworrv^to 
before me this _/J_day 
of H**cfc, 1987. 
